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Health and Safety Provisions in Union
Contracts: Power or Liability?
Larry C. Drapkin*
Morris E. Davis**
I INTRODUCTION
Congress enacted the Occupational Safety and Health Act
(the Act) a little over a decade ago.1 This legislation arose out
of an unrelenting crisis-an epidemic of injury, illness, and
death in America's workplaces.2 The enactment of this legisla-
tion, together with the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety
Act of 1969,3 signaled official recognition of a problem already
well known in the industrial world.
The passage of the Occupational Safety and Health Act sig-
naled a new approach to the problem of workplace hazards.
For the first time, a comprehensive federal law was intended to
prevent workplace injuries and illnesses rather than to com-
pensate workers already injured or ill. Under the common law
an employer was often legally liable for the work-related inju-
ries of employees. 4 With the passage of workers' compensation
legislation, employers again were recognized as being primarily
responsible for those injuries and illnesses arising "out of and
incidental to ... employment."5 Similarly, under the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Act it is the employer who must "fur-
nish to each of his employees employment and a place of
employment which are free from recognized hazards that are
causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm to
* Legal Coordinator, Labor Occupational Health Program, Institute of In-
dustrial Relations, University of California, Berkeley.
** Presiding Official, United States Merit Systems Protection Board, San
Francisco Field Office.
1. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat.
1590 (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976 & Supp. II 1979)).
2. See N. ASHFORD, CRISIS IN THE WORKPLACE 3 (1976), D. BERMAN, DEATH
ON THE JOB (1978); M. ROTHSTEIN, OcCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH LAW §§ 1-
2 (1978).
3. Pub. L. No. 91-173, 83 Stat. 742 (current version at 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-960
(1976 & Supp. I 1979)).
4. See D. BERMAN, supra note 2, at 19-20.
5. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 3600(b) (West 1971 & Supp. 1980).
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his employees." 6 Although employees have a duty to comply
with the Act's standards,7 the standards are primarily directed
toward, and only enforceable against, employers.8 The Act
does not explicitly or implicitly require employees' unions to
ensure or to seek safe and healthful working conditions. Fur-
thermore, the health and safety obligations of employers under
the Act are nondelegable and cannot be contractually assumed
by other employers or unions.9
Organized labor has influenced the Occupational Safety
and Health Act, and has, in turn, been influenced by it. Al-
though health and safety issues had been considered
"mandatory" subjects of bargaining under the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA)lO prior to 1970,11 widespread union activ-
ity on these issues was lacking. Since the enactment of the Oc-
cupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, however, a significant
number of bargaining agreements have incorporated specific
health and safety clauses. These provisions establish, for ex-
ample, labor-management health and safety committees, work-
place health and safety practices, and limitations for workplace
exposure to hazardous substances and working conditions.
As unions began to bargain for the right to influence and, at
times, control workplace health and safety practices, they were.
subjected to greater legal scrutiny. Since the early 1970s, nu-
merous lawsuits have been brought against unions by union
members, employers, and third-party manufacturers. These
cases usually involve allegations that the union-particularly a
union that has negotiated contract provisions dealing with
health and safety issues-inadequately used its power to se-
cure more safe and healthful working conditions. Conse-
quently, many unions fear costly and time-consuming litigation.
Responding to this fear, some unions have reassessed their de-
sire to negotiate actively on health and safety issues; other un-
ions have withdrawn entirely from such negotiations. This
Article will analyze the strengths and weaknesses of such
cases, particularly those cases that have arisen under the duty
6. 29 U.S.C. § 654(a) (1) (1976).
7. See 29 U.S.C. § 654(b) (1976).
8. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 651(b) (3), 654(a) (2) (1976).
9. See Frohlick Crane Serv., Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review
Comm'n, 521 F.2d 628, 631-32 (10th Cir. 1975); Howard Elec. Co., 78 OSAHRC
37/B9, p. 10 (1978) (microfiche); A.J. McNulty & Co., 76 OSAHRC 46/D2, p.10
(1976) (microfiche).
10. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1976).
11. NLRB v. Gulf Power Co., 384 F.2d 822, 825 (5th Cir. 1967) (construing 29
U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976)).
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of fair representation and under various common law theories
such as breach of contract or tort. This Article will then dis-
cuss various ways in which unions can minimize their legal
risks without deterring their interests in promoting more safe
and healthful work environments.
II. DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION
The duty of fair representation, which was judicially de-
rived from federal labor statutes, has recently served as the ba-
sis for suits alleging a labor union's failure to ensure workplace
health and safety for its members. Such suits may arise in
three contexts: contract negotiations, nonenforcement of col-
lective bargaining agreements, and processing of health and
safety grievances. Although a breach of this duty has been
found in a peripheral case, these health and safety related ac-
tions have generally been unsuccessful.
A. ORIGINs OF THE DUTY
Federal labor law vests a great deal of power in the recog-
nized bargaining representative-the union. Unions have the
right to represent exclusively and bargain for their member-
ship. Difficulties often arise, however, because of the large size
of bargaining units and the occasional conflicts among the
membership, specific unit members, management, and the
union. Because of the diversity of union functions as well as
the possibility that some members' interests may be wrongfully
overlooked, the Supreme Court has interpreted both section
9(a) of the NLRA12 and section 2 of the Railway Labor Act13 to
impose a duty of fair representation on the union that com-
mences when the union becomes the exclusive bargaining rep-
resentative for its unit members.14
The duty of fair representation was not expressly articu-
lated in the various labor laws. In establishing this duty by im-
plication, the Supreme Court in Steele v. Louisville & Nashville
Railroad15 stated:
It is a principle of general application that the exercise of a granted
12. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976).
13. 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1976).
14. See Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 337-38 (1953) (first case in
which the Supreme Court held that a union has a duty of fair representation
under section 9(a) of the Nt.RA); Steele v. Louisville & N.RL.L, 323 U.S. 192, 199-
203 (1944) (first case to find a duty of fair representation under the Railway La-
bor Act).
15. Steele v. Louisville & N.R.P., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
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power to act in behalf of others involves the assumption toward them
of a duty to exercise the power in their [the unit members'] interest
and behalf, and that such a grant of power will not be deemed to dis-
pense with all duty toward those for whom it is exercised unless so ex-
pressed.1 6
After comparing the similarity of functions of a legislature and
a union, particularly the duty of representatives nondis-
criminatorily to represent their constituencies, the Court in
Steele held that unless unions are required to comply with a
duty of fair representation, those in disfavor with the majority
will be denied equal representation. 7 Thus, a union now has
the duty to represent fairly all employees in the bargaining unit
for which it is the representative. This duty applies to contract
negotiations18 as well as to the evaluation and processing of
grievances. 1 9
B. How "DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION" SUITS ARE BROUGHT
.Under present case law, suits for breach of the duty of fair
representation can be brought in both state and federal courts
by implying a cause of action under the exclusive representa-
tion provision of an appropriate labor law.20 Many courts have
entertained such suits under section 301 of the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act,21 which affords employees the right to sue
for breach of a union-management contract. Additionally, some
courts hold that the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)
can independently and concurrently determine whether a
union committed an unfair labor practice by breaching its duty
of fair representation. 22
16. Id. at 202.
17. Id. at 202-03.
18. Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 337 (1953).
19. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190-92 (1967).
20. See Syres v. Oil Workers Local 23, 350 U.S. 892 (mem.), rev'g 223 F.2d
739 (5th Cir. 1955) (suit under NLRA); Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192,
202-03 (1944) (suit under Railway Labor Act).
21. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1976). Federal law standards are applied in both state
and federal courts. See Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 102-
04 (1962); Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456-57 (1957).
22. See NLRB v. Glass Bottle Blowers Local 106, 520 F.2d 693, 697 (6th Cir.
1975); Truck Drivers & Helpers Local 568 v. NLRB, 379 F.2d 137, 141-42 (D.C. Cir.
1967); Local 12, United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic Workers v. NLRB, 368
F.2d 12, 17 (5th Cir. 1966). In Miranda Fuel Co., the NLRB asserted its power to
treat as an unfair labor practice a union's breach of its duty of fair representa-
tion, 140 N.L.R.B. 181, 185 (1962), enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963),
and in Vaca v. Sipes the Supreme Court implicitly affirmed the validity of the
NLRB's jurisdiction to do so. 386 U.S. 171, 176-88 (1967). See generally R.
GoRMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAw 698-701 (1976).
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C. DEFINITION OF BREACH OF THE DUTY OF FAIR
REPRESENTATION
Although courts disagree as to the scope of the duty of fair
representation, it is clear that a breach of the duty occurs when
a union's conduct toward a bargaining unit employee is "arbi-
trary, discriminatory, or in bad faith."23 This standard does not
require a union to process all grievances or to negotiate equal
working conditions for all unit employees. A union has a "wide
range of reasonableness . . .subject always to complete good
faith and honesty of purpose in the exercise of its discretion." 24
Courts have held that a union breaches the duty of fair rep-
resentation by bargaining for discriminatory contract provi-
sions,2 5 by ignoring2 6 or failing to evaluate carefully 27 the basis
of a grievance, or by handling the grievance in a perfunctory or
discriminatory manner regardless of whether there is bad
faith.28 Courts still maintain that union negligence alone does
not constitute a breach of the duty of fair representation. 29 The
distinction between negligence and perfunctory behavior, how-
ever, is slight.30
D. BREACH OF THE DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION
CONCERNING HEALTH AND SAFETY ISSUES
1. Contract Negotiation
Under the duty of fair representation, a union generally has
great leeway in negotiating contract language.31 A union can-
23. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190 (1967).
24. Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953).
25. See Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 202-03 (1944) (variations
in contract terms based on racial differences alone are 'irrelevant and invidi-
ous" discriminations that breach the duty of fair representation).
26. See Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 523 F.2d 306, 310 (6th Cir. 1975)
(union representative's inexplicable failure to file requisite grievance state-
ment before final deadline constitutes "arbitrary and perfunctory handling of a
grievance" and thus breaches the duty of fair representation).
27. See Figueroa de Arroyo v. Sindicato de Trabajadores Packinghouse, 425
F.2d 281, 284 (1st Cir.) (inadequate investigation of the merits of a grievance
constitutes arbitrary and perfunctory handling and thus violates the duty of
fair representation), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 877 (1970).
28. See Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 523 F.2d 306, 310 (6th Cir. 1975)
("Union action which is arbitrary or discriminatory need not be motivated by
bad faith to amount to unfair representation."); Beriault v. Local 40, Super Car-
goes & Checkers, 501 F.2d 258, 264 (9th Cir. 1974) (bad faith need not be shown).
29. Dente v. Masters Local 90, 492 F.2d 10 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417
U.S. 910 (1974).
30. See R. GORMAN, supra note 22, at 719-21.
31. See Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953); R. GORmAN,
supra note 22, at 695-97.
1981]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
not, however, use its power to bargain away those rights that
are guaranteed by law to individual employees. Thus, it is a
breach of a union's duty of fair representation to encourage the
inclusion of or bargain for discriminatory contract provisions
based on race,3 2 sex,33 or union membership.3 4 Arguably, a
union's bargaining away of workers' Occupational Safety and
Health Act rights might constitute a violation of its duty of fair
representation. Furthermore, if a union willfully allowed cer-
tain employees to be exposed to health hazards because of
race, sex, or union membership, the duty of fair representation
might be breached. Thus, if a union failed to try to remedy
health hazards predominantly affecting a specific work popula-
tion (such as women, minority workers, or ethnic groups) a
breach might occur. Without a showing of discrimination, how-
ever, it is doubtful that a breach of the duty of fair representa-
tion will be found because of a union's failure to bargain on
health and safety issues. 35
2. Nonenforcement of Bargaining Agreement Health and
Safety Provisions
Many unions regularly negotiate for specific contract provi-
sions dealing with health and safety issues. 36 These clauses
may provide for the establishment of joint labor-management
health and safety committees that have the right to inspect
working conditions and make appropriate recommendations, 3 7
and for the right of a union to withdraw workers from hazard-
ous job assignments.3 8 A union's nonenforcement or inade-
32. Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 203 (1944).
33. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 209 N.L.R.B. 519, 526 (1974).
34. Thompson v. Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, 316 F.2d 191, 199
(4th Cir. 1963).
35. Although health and safety matters are generally mandatory subjects
of bargaining under section 8(d) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976), see
NLRB v. Gulf Power Co., 384 F.2d 822, 825 (5th Cir. 1967), no law requires that a
union raise a subject merely because if raised an employer would have to bar-
gain over it. Further, the employer already is required to provide employees
with a safe and healthful workplace. See 29 U.S.C. § 654(a) (1976).
36. In a 1976 sampling of bargaining agreements by the United States De-
partment of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, 93% contained language bearing
on employee safety and health or on accident and occupational disability pro-
cedures. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, BuuL. No. 1425-16,
MAJOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS: SAFETY AND HEALTH PROVISIONS
3 (1976).
37. See House v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., 417 F. Supp. 939, 942 n.1 (D.
Idaho 1976).
38. See Helton v. Hake, 564 S.W.2d 313, 316 (Mo. App.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 959 (1978).
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quate enforcement of such provisions can result in lawsuits
based on a breach of the union's duty of fair representation. 39
Workers who bring these duty of fair representation cases seek
to recover consequential damages that are not provided by
workers' compensation benefits.40 A suit against the union
based on breach of the duty of fair representation is often the
only cause of action a worker has because of the employer's
protected status under the exclusive remedy provisions of most
workers' compensation laws.4 1 In addition, employers or manu-
facturers who are sued by employees can file a third-party com-
plaint against a union if they can show that the employee
would have had a cause of action against the union either for
the breach of the duty of fair representation or under common
law.42
In Brough v. United Steelworkers,43 the first duty of fair
representation case involving occupational health and safety is-
sues, the union was sued by a member who was injured while
operating a machine alleged to be faulty. The plaintiff made
two claims against the union: that it negligently performed its
role as "safety advisor" to the employer under state common
law principles, and that it breached its federal law duty of fair
representation to the employees. Granting summary judgment
for the union on the duty of fair representation count, the court
stated that federal labor law "imposes upon the exclusive bar-
gaining representative only a duty of good faith representation,
not a general duty of due care."4 4 This general standard was
followed and expanded in Bryant v. International Union,
UMW.45
The Bryant case was brought by the estates of coal miners
who died in a mine explosion against the mining company for
39. These cases have traditionally arisen out of workplace disasters or ac-
cidents. See, e.g., Bryant v. International Union, UMW, 467 F.2d 1, 2 (6th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 930 (1973) (mine explosion); Brough v. United Steel-
workers, 437 F.2d 748, 749 (1st Cir. 1971) (union member injured while operating
allegedly faulty machine); House v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., 417 F. Supp.
939, 941 (D. Idaho 1976) (mine fire); Helton v. Hake, 564 S.W.2d 313, 315 (Mo.
App.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 959 (1978) (iron worker electrocuted). However, no
punitive or exemplary damages are allowed. See note 53 infra.
40. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 197-98 (1967).
41. See, e.g., CmL LAB. CODE § 3601 (West 1971 & Supp. 1980).
42. Globig v. Johns-Manville Sales Co., 486 F. Supp. 735, 740 (E.D. Wis.
1980).
43. 437 F.2d 748 (1st Cir. 1971).
44. Id. at 750 (emphasis added). The state court claim for common law
negligence, however, was remanded to the state court. The union impleaded
the company and settled for $10,000 in order to avoid further litigation.
45. 467 F.2d 1 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 930 (1973).
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failure to comply with Federal Mine Safety Code standards,
and against the union for failure to ensure the company's com-
pliance with those standards. The collective bargaining agree-
ment provided that upon discovery of a safety code violation
the company must promptly carry out the federal inspector's
recommended abatement, and that the union safety committee
"may inspect any mine development or equipment used in pro-
ducing coal" and may remove any workers from an area it
deems unsafe.40 The Sixth Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Cel-
ebrezze, held that: 1) no violations had been reported by any
federal inspector, thus the union had no enforcement obliga-
tion; and 2) the bargaining agreement provided only that the
union "may" rather than "shall" or "must" inspect the mine
area, and therefore the union had no duty to inspect.47 The
court implied that a duty of fair representation action could not
prevail without allegations of discriminatory, arbitrary, or bad
faith behavior by the union.48 More importantly, the court ex-
pressed its doubt that "the contract necessarily makes the
Union financially responsible for a failure to compel correction
of Code violations even in situations where such violations have
been reported by federal mine inspectors." 49 The court ex-
amined the nature and purpose of bargaining agreements and
stated:
Collective bargaining agreements are literally agreements between un-
ions and employers; the Union negotiators are intent on gaining the
maximum power possible from management negotiators. Whether or
not they choose to exercise all the power gained depends on a variety
of situations relating to the overall employment situation in the indus-
try. It would be a mistake of vast proportion to read every power
granted the union by management as creating a corollary contract right
in the employee as against the union. Such interpretation of collective
bargaining agreements would simply deter unions from engaging in the
unfettered give and take negotiation which lies at the heart of the col-
lective bargaining agreement. 50
Articulating what has become the main policy reason
against allowing union liability, Judge Celebrezze noted that by
allowing liability the courts would deter unions from including
health and safety provisions in future contracts.5. The Sixth
Circuit recognized that such a development would 'retard...
46. Id. at 3 n.3.
47. Id. at 4-5.
48. Id. at 5.
49. Id. at 4.
50. Id. at 5 (emphasis added).
51. Id. at 6.
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the goals of the National Labor policy."5 2 Such "chilling" of
federal labor law's goals is not tolerated by the courts.5 3
Other courts have been sensitive to another policy concern
inherent in allowing union liability for failure to enforce con-
tract provisions-allowing liability would shift health and
safety responsibility from the employer to the union.54 Such a
development would conflict with the well-established common
law and statutory doctrine that makes the employer responsi-
ble for ensuring workplace health and safety.55 A Pennsylvania
court has determined that Congress did not attempt to alter the
employer's traditional responsibility for health and safety, stat-
ing that "[b]y imposing upon [the union] the duty of fair repre-
sentation, Congress sought to prevent it from neglecting the
wishes of the minority 'electorate' . . .; Congress did not seek
to make the union responsible for its members' working condi-
tions." 56
Both state and federal courts have uniformly failed to find
that a union has breached its duty of fair representation by
52. Id. See aLso House v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., 417 F. Supp. 939, 944
(D. Idaho 1976). The court in Higley v. Disston, Inc., 92 L.R.R.M. 2443, 2444
(1976), reiterated Bryant's analysis:
[The] Union by attempting to improve the working and safety condi-
tions of its members ... through the introduction into its collective
bargaining agreement with Plaintiff's employer of provisions dealing
with safety, did not thereby assume a duty or liability to its members
... to provide them with a safe place to work and is not chargeable
with the duty of reasonable care in making the safety inspections.
53. See, e.g., IBEW v. Foust, 99 S. Ct. 2121, 2127-28 (1979). In Foust, the
Court refused to award punitive damages in duty of fair representation suits
under the Railway Labor Act. The Court stated that such damages thwart the
intent of labor legislation by limiting union flexibility in deciding which cases it
should process to arbitration and by possibly threatening the economic stabil-
ity of unions. Id. at 2127. The same reasoning is applicable in duty of fair rep-
resentation suits concerning health and safety issues. Imposing liability upon a
union for negligent exercise or failure to exercise a bargained-for right may
serve to deter the union from participating in health and safety activities,
thereby limiting union flexibility in an area of considerable importance. In ad-
dition, the possibility that victims of mass disasters will sue a union for breach
of its duty of fair representation concerning health and safety matters may
threaten the economic stability of unions. For example, the Oil, Chemical and
Atomic Workers Union settled a lawsuit, arising from its alleged negligence in
not informing its members of the hazards to which they were exposed, in order
to avoid the costs of litigation and potential economic disaster if a judgment
were entered against the Union. See 7 Occupational Health & Safety Letter 3
(Dec. 22, 1977).
54. House v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., 417 F. Supp. 939, 946-47 (D. Idaho
1976); Brooks v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co., 170 N.J. Super. 20, 34, 405 A.2d 466,
473, cert. denied, 408 A.2d 806 (1979).
55. See notes 4-9 supra and accompanying text.
56. Carollo v. Forty-Eight Insulation, Inc., 381 A.2d 990, 995 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1977).
1981]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
negligently enforcing or failing to enforce a contract provision
concerning health and safety, even in cases in which the union
has the power to remove employees from hazardous condi-
tions.57 Thus, a union safety committee established to monitor
safety conditions and to make appropriate recommendations
does not breach its duty of fair representation if it is aware of a
potentially hazardous condition but fails to try to correct it
merely because no employees complained about the condi-
tion.58 Neither will a union's failure actively to search out and
discover workplace health hazards constitute a violation of its
duty of fair representation.59 Nor will a union breach its duty
to a member if it negligently refers to the worksite a violence-
prone individual who maliciously attacks the member.60
Although negligence alone does not constitute a breach of
the duty of fair representation, a negligent act may violate that
duty if it can be interpreted as "arbitrary" conduct. In Ruzicka
v. General Motors Co.,61 a union representative who forgot to
process a grievance within the appropriate time limit was
deemed intolerably negligent by the court because the union
was on notice that its member wanted to continue his griev-
ance to the next stage of processing. The court held that such
"negligent handling" of a grievance was a "clear example of ar-
bitrary and perfunctory" union action and thus breached the
union's duty of fair representation.62 In a concurring opinion,
Judge McCree acknowledged that Ruzicka establishes the prin-
ciple that a union representative's negligent handling of a
grievance by failing to act in a timely manner is "so egregious
that . .. the union should be held responsible."63 Ruzicka,
however, does not mean that a union's failure to enforce its in-
57. Helton v. Hake, 386 F. Supp. 1027, 1032 (W.D. Mo. 1974); R. GORMAN,
supra note 22, at 719-20. But see Helton v. Hake, 564 S.W.2d 313 (Mo. App.) (up-
held a state tort action against a union that failed to provide a safe working en-
vironment), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 959 (1978) (for discussion of Helton, see notes
74-78 infra and accompanying text); R. GORmAN, supra note 22, at 720-21 (a
number of courts have found no distinction between "negligent" and "arbi-
trary" union action).
58. See Brooks v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co., 170 N.J. Super. 20, 27, 36, 405
A.2d 466, 469, 474 (union safety committee was aware of disconnected safety
switch but did not try to correct the hazard), cert. denied, 408 A.2d 806 (1979).
59. See Farmer v. General Refractories Co., 413 A.2d 701, 705 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1979); Carollo v. Forty-Eight Insulation Inc., 381 A.2d 990, 995 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1977).
60. See Hartsfield v. Seafarers Int'l Union, 427 F. Supp. 264, 269-70 (D.C.
Ala. 1977).
61. 523 F.2d 306 (6th Cir. 1975).
62. Id. at 310.
63. Id. at 316.
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spection right is a breach of its duty of fair representation. Ru-
zicka can be distinguished from those health and safety
related cases previously discussed on the ground that it in-
volved procedural negligence which can be easily prevented.
Moreover, Judge Celebrezze's opinion for the court in Ruzicka
in no way contradicts his earlier opinion in Bryant. Bryant's
specific concern with promoting union flexibility in enforcing
contracts generally 64 is quite different from unacceptable inac-
tion on a specific member's grievance.
3. Breach of the Duty of Fair Representation in Evaluating or
Processing a Health and Safety Grievance
The duty of fair representation requires that a union not
process health and safety grievances arbitrarily, discriminato-
rily, or in bad faith.65 Although the law of fair representation is
broad in scope,66 several principles are important to an under-
standing of that duty in the health and safety context.
A union can decide not to proceed with a meritorious griev-
ance for numerous reasons. The union can refuse to process a
grievance further because, in its good faith opinion, the griev-
ance has little chance of further success 67 or because the
chance of success does not merit the cost of pursuing redress.68
It is questionable, however, whether a union could arbitrarily
64. Bryant v. International Union, UMW, 467 F.2d 1, 4-5 (6th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied 410 U.S. 930 (1973).
65. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967); notes 23-24 supra and accom-
panying text.
66. See generally Summers, The Individual Employee's Rights Under the
Collective Agreement What Constitutes Fair Representation?, 126 U. PA. L
REv. 251 (1977).
67. See Powell v. Globe Indus., Inc., 431 F. Supp. 1096, 1099-1100 (N.D. Ohio
1977). In Powell, the union refused to take a grievance to arbitration on the be-
lief that the company's offer to reinstate the grievant without back pay was the
best that could be obtained. The grievant, who had allegedly been discrimi-
nated against because he reported health and safety violations to the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Administration, refused to settle. The court held that
the union was motivated by a proper concern-that if the reinstatement offer
were rejected, the grievant could be left jobless because there was a high
probability that the discharge would be upheld at arbitration. Id. If the union
had informed the grievant that it would take the case to arbitration and, the
grievant had done so, the union would probably have been guilty of breach of
its duty of fair representation. Even if the failure to tell the grievant of its un-
willingness to arbitrate was an inadvertant error, the duty would nevertheless
be breached. "Acts of omission by union officials not intended to harm mem-
bers may be so egregious, so far short of minimum standards of fairness to the
employee and so unrelated to legitimate union interests as to be arbitrary."
Robesky v. Quantas Empire Airways Ltd., 573 F.2d 1082, 1090 (9th Cir. 1978).
68. See Turner v. Air Transp. Dispatchers' Ass'n, 468 F.2d 297, 299 (5th Cir.
1972); Orphan v. Furnco Constr. Corp., 466 F.2d 795, 802 (7th Cir. 1972).
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or perfunctorily refuse to grieve matters arising under a partic-
ular clause in a collective bargaining agreement solely because
the union has decided not to enforce that section. Professor
Summers has suggested that such a decision would constitute
an undemocratic nullification of the contract:
The union's refusal to enforce a clear provision in the collective
agreement cuts at the very root of its duty of fair representation. The
union as representative of the employees owes to them the duty an
agent owes to his principal. How can an agent authorized to make a
contract on behalf of his principal, make the contract and then deprive
his principal of its benefits? 69
Professor Summers' point has important implications for
unions that bargain for contract provisions dealing with the
health and safety of workers. It suggests that a union could not
refuse to assert its contractual health and safety rights because
its leadership is not interested in pursuing them. Thus, a
union's power to ignore certain health and safety concerns
could be significantly reduced. Summers' proposal would not,
however, change the result in cases such as Bryant7o in which
the union's failure to exercise its enforcement power did not
breach its duty of fair representation. The distinction is clear-
a union can choose not to enforce a contractual provision as
long as union members have not sought to enforce that particu-
lar provision.
A union handling a health and safety grievance involving
the interpretation of technical or scientific data may breach its
duty of fair representation by failing to obtain expert witnesses
to represent its grievants. Recently a district court held that a
union violated its duty of fair representation by providing in-
competent nonexpert representation for a member seeking re-
instatement after surgery,7 ' reasoning that the union's actions
were tantamount to '"perfunctory representation."72 Thus, a
union may have a duty not only to enforce meritorious health
and safety grievances but also to provide expert representation.
Ironically, although a union may be obligated to grieve all
meritorious claims and supply expensive expert representa-
tion, it might still successfully argue that the union budget can-
69. Summers, supra note 66, at 266. Cf. Price v. International Bhd. of
Teamsters, 457 F.2d 605, 610 (3d Cir. 1972) (implicit in section 104 of the Lan-
drum-Griffin Act is the assumption that absent appropriate amendment of the
labor contract there could be no changes in the agreement that would abrogate
rights contained in it).
70. See notes 45-53 supra and accompanying text.
71. Curtis v. United Transp. Union, 102 L.R.M. 2961, 2962 (1979).
72. Id. See also Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 570-71
(1976).
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not afford such costly grievances. 3 Thus, the duty of fair
representation has afforded litigants only limited success in
suits against labor unions involving health and safety issues.
III. NEGLIGENCE ACTIONS UNDER COMMON LAW
In numerous cases plaintiffs who could not prevail in duty
of fair representation suits have instead brought common law
tort actions against their unions. Most of these cases involve
allegations that the union breached a duty of care to its mem-
bership by negligently enforcing or failing to enforce relevant
health and safety provisions, or by failing to discover or warn
employees about health and safety hazards. Although negli-
gence alone is not sufficient to show breach of a union's duty of
fair representation, it will support a cause of action under state
tort law. Nevertheless, the doctrine of federal preemption has
precluded most duty of fair representation cases from being
brought as tort claims.
The landmark negligence case arising out of a union's
health and safety duty is Helton v. Hake.7 4 In Helton, an em-
ployee was electrocuted while working near noninsulated high-
tension wires. The union was sued in tort for failing to comply
with its obligation under the bargaining agreement to ensure
the safety of employees who work near high tension lines.7 5
Significantly, the union contract provided that the union stew-
ard "'shall see that the provisions of these working rules are
complied with"' and that "'the Employer is in no way respon-
sible for the performance of these functions by the steward.' "76
The Missouri Court of Appeals found that under this contrac-
tual language the union chose "to go far beyond a mere advi-
sory status or representative capacity in the processing of
grievances. Rather, it [took] over for itself a managerial func-
tion, namely the full independent right to enforce safety re-
quirements." 77 The court held that once the union assumed the
affirmative duty of ensuring a safe workplace, it could be liable
in tort for a breach of that duty.78
The Helton court distinguished the result in Bryant79 by
relying heavily on the language of the union contract in Helton,
73. See notes 67-68 supra and accompanying text.
74. 564 S.W.2d 313 (Mo. App.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 959 (1978).
75. Id. at 316.
76. Id. (quoting collective bargaining agreement).
77. Id. at 321 (footnote omitted).
78. Id.
79. See notes 45-53 supra and accompanying text.
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which explicitly gave the union the sole responsibility for en-
suring workplace safety. The court never considered whether
the union's assumption of the employer's duty to provide a safe
workplace was consistent with public policy. Arguably, an em-
ployer cannot legally delegate the responsibility to ensure
workplace health and safety. In enforcement cases, the Occu-
pational Safety and Health Review Commission and the courts
have consistently held that employers cannot contractually es-
cape their primary responsibilities under the Occupational
Safety and Health Act.80
Few other health and safety cases against unions have
been successful under a theory of common law negligence.8 1 In
Dunbar v. United Steelworkers,8 2 the only case that directly fol-
lows Helton, the Idaho Supreme Court held that survivors of a
mining disaster may bring negligence actions against their
union for failure to function adequately as an accident preven-
tion representative.8 3 For the most part, however, cases alleg-
ing union negligence in health and safety matters have held
that federal labor law preempts the states' common law, and
federal law standards for breach of the duty of fair representa-
tion have thus been applied.84
80. See Frohlick Crane Serv., Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review
Comm'n, 521 F.2d 628, 631-32 (10th Cir. 1975); Howard Elec. Co., 78 OSAHRC
37/B9, p. 10 (1978) (microfiche); A.J. McNulty & Co., 76 OSAHRC 46/D2, p.10
(1976) (microfiche).
81. The only other reported case, Nivins v. Sievers Hauling Corp., 424 F.
Supp. 82 (D.N.J. 1976), involved a claim by an employer against the union from
which he had contracted to hire construction workers. The agreement required
that competent employees be referred by the union to the employer. Id. at 85.
The court found the union had an "express duty under the contract" to provide
competent workers. Id. Thus, when the union breached that obligation and a
subsequent injury resulted from that breach, the union was liable for the re-
sulting damages. Id. at 88-89. Because this case was brought by the employer,
and not by a unit member, no duty of fair representation questions arose.
82. 100 Idaho 523, 602 P.2d 21 (1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 2963 (1980). But
see House v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., 417 F. Supp. 939 (D. Idaho 1976). In
House, the federal district court held that federal labor law preempted a state
tort action arising out of the same Sunshine Mine disaster as in Dunbar. Id. at
945.
83. 100 Idaho at 528-29, 602 P.2d at 26-27.
84. See notes 85-99 infra and accompanying text. It is interesting to note
that individual employees, as opposed to their unions, are more likely to be
governed by common law standards. An individual's potential liability, how-
ever, is virtually eliminated by agency principles and by workers' compensa-
tion statutes. Under agency principles, individual union agents and officials are
not personally liable for the negligent performance of their duties when serving
as a union representative on any health and safety committee. See Atkinson v.
Sinclair Ref. Co., 370 U.S. 238, 247-49 (1962). Under most workers' compensation
statutes, lawsuits against fellow workers for their ordinary negligence arising
out of the scope of employment are prohibited. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CoDE § 3601
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IV. FEDERAL LABOR LAW PREEMPTION OF STATE
COMMON LAW REMEDIES
Courts generally recognize that the relationships among
most private sector "labor unions, union members, and employ-
ers are governed solely by federal law."85 Therefore, federal la-
bor law will preempt inconsistent state laws. The United
States Supreme Court has emphasized the need for a uniform
national labor policy:
The course of events that eventuated in the enactment of a com-
prehensive national labor law, . . . reveals that a primary factor in this
development was the perceived incapacity of common-law courts and
state legislatures, acting alone, to provide an informed and coherent
basis for stabilizing labor relations conflict and for equitably and deli-
cately structuring the balance of power among competing forces so as
to further the common good.8 6
The states, however, are not totally precluded from regulating
behavior that is peripheral to the policies sought to be pro-
moted by federal law, particularly when the regulated conduct
is traditionally a matter of deeply rooted local concern.8 7
In San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon,8 8 the
Supreme Court held that "[w]hen it is clear or may fairly be
assumed that the activities which a State purports to regulate
are protected by § 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, or con-
stitute an unfair labor practice under § 8, due regard for the
federal enactment requires that state jurisdiction must yield."89
Although breach of the duty of fair representation may be con-
sidered an unfair labor practice,90 a union's negligent nonen-
forcement of a general contract provision (absent a grievance)
does not constitute a violation of its duty of fair representa-
(West 1971 & Supp. 1980). Cf. House v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., 417 F.
Supp. 939, 947 (D. Idaho 1976) (suggests that when the union membership con-
sists of fellow employees, the workers' compensation prohibition against suing
fellow employees should prohibit negligence suits against the union).
85. Globig v. Johns-Manville Sales Co., 486 F. Supp. 735, 740 (E.D. Wis.
1980); see also Amalgamated Ass'n of Street, Elec. Railway & Motor Coach Em-
ployees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 286 (1971).
86. Amalgamated Ass'n of Street, Elec. Railway & Motor Coach Employees
v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 286 (1971). See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182 (1967)
(federal labor law promotes improvement of working conditions); 29 U.S.C.
§ 151 (1976).
87. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244 (1959).
See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of
Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180 (1978) (trespass); Farmer v. Carpenters & Joiners Lo-
cal 25, 430 U.S. 290 (1977) (intentional infliction of emotional distress); Linn v.
Plant Guard Workers Local 114, 383 U.S. 53 (1966) (defamation).
88. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
89. Id. at 244.
90. See note 22 supra and accompanying text.
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tion.91 Therefore, union negligence of this sort is neither pro-
hibited nor protected by federal law. A number of courts,
however, have held that a union's only duty to its members is
subsumed within the duty of fair representation. These courts
have held that any claim arising out of any duty allegedly owed
by the union to an employee must be governed solely by fed-
eral labor law standards for breach of the duty of fair represen-
tation.
The preemption issue was raised in House v. Mine Safety
Appliances Co. ,92 a suit by the survivors of miners killed in the
Sunshine Mine disaster against the employers. The employers
filed third-party complaints against the union alleging that the
union committed a common law tort by negligently performing
its assumed duty of preventing unsafe conditions. The federal
district court found that a common law negligence action alleg-
ing a union's breach of its safety duty was "inextricably inter-
twined and embodied in the union's duty of fair
representation."93 The court held that any claim of negligence
arising out of the enforcement of duties assumed in a bargain-
ing agreement must be governed by federal law and the duty of
fair representation, not by state common law;9 4 thus, the com-
mon law action was preempted.
Similarly, in Globig v. Johns-Manville Sales Co.,95 another
federal court refused to find an exception to the preemption
doctrine in a suit involving allegations that a union negligently
performed its safety duty on behalf of its members. The court
found that "[t] he duties and responsibilities of a labor union to
its members is not a peripheral concern of the federal labor
policy, nor is there a deep rooted state interest in imposing a
duty of care which does not exist under federal law."96 Other
courts have also held that tort claims alleging a union's inade-
quate protection of workplace health and safety pose a signifi-
cant potential for interference with federal labor law;97 these
91. See notes 57-60 supra and accompanying text.
92. 417 F. Supp. 939 (D. Idaho 1976).
93. Id. See also Hartsfleld v. Seafarers Int'l Union, 427 F. Supp. 264, 270
(S.D. Ala. 1977).
94. Id. at 945.
95. 486 F. Supp. 735 (E.D. Wis. 1980).
96. Id. at 741.
97. See Farmer v. General Refractories Co., 413 A.2d 701, 705 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1979); Carollo v. Forty-Eight Insulation, Inc., 381 A.2d 990, 996 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1977). See also Farmer v. Carpenters & Joiners Local 25, 430 U.S. 290, 302 (1977)
(inflexible preemption doctrine is avoided when states' "interest is one that
does not threaten undue interference with the federal regulatory scheme").
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courts have therefore found federal preemption of the state
claim. A few courts have not specifically held that the federal
law preempts state law. A number of those courts, however, ei-
ther have declined to rule on the merits of the negligence is-
sue9 8 or have found that the union did not breach any common
law duty to the employee.99
Two significant cases, Helton v. Hake100 and Dunbar v.
United Steelworkers,0 1 allow common law negligence actions
regardless of the preemption doctrine. In Helton, the court
found that the contract language created a mandatory duty in
the union to seek out and correct health and safety hazardsl02
Helton sought to distinguish both House and Bryant by show-
ing that the union did not fail to exercise a permissive right to
inspect the workplace. To the contrary, the court held that
under the bargaining agreement the union took over the mana-
gerial function of the employer to provide a safe and healthful
workplace and thus assumed consequential common law duties
arising from that contract.103 The language in Bryant declaring
that all contract provisions are not enforceable against the
union was held to apply only when the union has a nonmanda-
tory duty.l0 4
The Dunbar court's holding was even broader; it did not
seek to base its decision on the distinction between mandatory
and permissive functions. In deciding that a common law ac-
tion for wrongful death is not preempted, the court emphasized
that the NLRB does not decide such cases.105 Under the Dun-
bar analysis, a union could potentially be liable for any duty to
ensure workplace health and safety regardless of whether that
duty is mandatory or permissive.
The Dunbar and Helton courts determined that the negli-
gent enforcement of a bargaining agreement could not consti-
tute a breach of a union's duty of fair representation.106
Therefore, they concluded that under the Garmon test10 7 pre-
98. Brough v. United Steelworkers, 437 F.2d 748, 750 (1st Cir. 1971) (case re-
manded to state court; settled before trial).
99. Bryant v. International Union, 467 F.2d 1 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
410 U.S. 930 (1973); Burkhart v. Illinois Power Co., 9 Ill. App. 3d 139, 142-43, 291
N.E.2d 673, 675-76 (1973).
100. 564 S.W.2d 313 (Mo. App.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 959 (1978).
101. 100 Idaho 523, 602 P.2d 21 (1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 2963 (1980).
102. 564 S.W.2d at 321.
103. Id. at 319-21.
104. Id. at 320.
105. 100 Idaho at 526, 602 P.2d at 24.
106. Dunbar, 100 Idaho at 527, 602 P.2d at 25; Helton, 564 S.W.2d at 318-19.
107. See text accompanying note 88 supra.
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emption was not required.108 These courts also found that a
common law cause of action would not create a conflict be-
tween state and federal law because the common law duty is
peripheral to the intent of the duty of fair representation.109
The Dunbar court disagreed with the conclusion of the court in
House"o that the common law duty was intertwined with the
duty of fair representation. Rather, the Dunbar court con-
cluded that any potential for conflict with the federal duty was
"tangential at best.""'
The cases indicate clear disagreement as to whether com-
mon law negligence actions will actually interfere with the
goals and purposes of the federal labor laws. Successful wrong-
ful death cases may directly deter unions from bargaining on at
least some types of health and safety provisions. If Dunbar is
followed in other jurisdictions, unions may well be discouraged
from establishing health and safety committees or from taking
an active role in hazard identification and correction. Such con-
sequences will retard the federal policy of promoting workplace
cooperation and improvement. Thus, in the area of health and
safety, the duty of fair representation must be seen as the ex-
clusive duty owed by the union to its members. The imposition
of more stringent standards will undermine union efforts to
supplement and make more effective the workplace health and
safety protections afforded workers by the Occupational Safety
and Health Act.
V. HOW TO AVOID UNION LIABILITY
Bargaining on health and safety issues should not be de-
terred because of a few successful lawsuits. Unions can act to
lessen significantly the chances of being embroiled in litigation
arising either out of a breach of the duty of fair representation
or out of a common law duty for the negligent performance of
their health and safety functions. Unions can insulate them-
selves from liability through both careful drafting of their
health and safety contract provisions and thorough exercise of
their contractual prerogatives to encourage workplace health
and safety. Several of the legislative developments that may
significantly alter and prevent union liability for health and
108. Dunbar, 100 Idaho at 527-28, 602 P.2d at 25-26; Helton, 564 S.W.2d at 318-
19.
109. Dunbar, 100 Idaho at 528-29, 602 P.2d at 26-27; Helton, 564 S.W.2d at 318-
19.
110. See text accompanying notes 92-93 supra.
111. 100 Idaho at 529, 602 P.2d at 27.
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safety activities could also serve to protect unions that are ac-
tive in this area.
A. PROTECTIVE CONTRACT PROVISIONS
The major case holding a union liable for negligent per-
formance of its health and safety functions, Helton v. Hake,112
based its holding on the rationale that the union voluntarily as-
sumed "the full independent right to enforce safety require-
ments."n13 Because the union had the unilateral power to
enforce contract provisions concerning health and safety
issues, and therefore to remove workers from hazardous work
areas, the court found that in this particular case the union had
far greater control over workplace conditions than do most un-
ions.1 1 4 The Helton court, therefore, held that a union can con-
tractually assume a duty of care to its members when it begins
to exercise control over workplace conditions.
Although some unions may be content with not having in-
dependent control over health and safety conditions in the
workplace, others perceive such power to be essential in order
to protect unit members. Therefore, the response to the Helton
case should not be to retreat from negotiating for the unilateral
power to control working conditions. Instead, unions may ne-
gotiate clauses that give them the permissive power to exercise
control, thereby retaining the same power and influence over
workplace conditions. Thus, in Helton the clause providing that
the union steward "'shall see that the provisions of these
working rules are complied with,"'115 should have read "the
union steward may require that the provisions of these work-
ing rules are complied with." The permissive power would
then have paralleled the union's power in Bryant. In that case,
Judge Celebrezze pointed out that a union does not assume a
duty to enforce all of its contract rights.116 Noting that the bar-
gaining agreement stated that the union "may inspect any
mine," the court held that "It]he use of the permissive 'may'
rather than obligatory language in the clause clearly negatives
the possibility that any duty was to be created."1' 7 Signifi-
cantly, the Helton court distinguished the permissive duty in
112. 564 S.W.2d 313 (Mo. App.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 959 (1978).
113. Id. at 321. See notes 76-78 supra and accompanying text.
114. See id. at 321 & n.2.
115. Id. at 316 (emphasis added) (quoting collective bargaining agreement).
116. Bryant v. International Union, UMW, 467 F.2d 1, 5 (6th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 410 U.S. 930 (1973).
117. Id.
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Bryant from the "full duty" assumed by the union in Helton.118
In addition to changing the nature of its duty from a
mandatory to a permissive one, a union may draft other con-
tract provisions to protect itself from liability. A union should
seek to have the contract reiterate the employer's exclusive
duty to provide a safe and healthful workplace." 9 The contract
should also contain a clause stating that the union, by negotiat-
ing for and establishing, its power to control health and safety
conditions, does not assume any of the employer's exclusive
duty. In addition, some unions have included language provid-
ing that the international union, local unions, union safety com-
mittees, union officers, employees, and agents will not be liable
for any work-related injuries, disabilities, or diseases.120 Such
language attempts to insulate the union from lawsuits brought
by its unit members and their survivors, and from third party
lawsuits brought by consumers, employers, or manufacturers.
Although such "hold-harmless" clauses sound attractive to
a cautious union, they may, in part, be both deceptive and
against public policy. If the bargaining agreement is perceived
as a contract between the employer and the union for the bene-
fit of the employees under a third-party beneficiary theory,' 2 '
employees could not be bound by any contract clause insulat-
ing the union from lawsuits brought by unit members. 22 In ad-
dition, courts are not willing to uphold such disclaimers if, in
their opinion, injustice will result.123
An employer's waiver of any cause of action resulting from
alleged union negligence (third-party actions) is likely to be
upheld by the courts. The doctrine of assumption of risk allows
parties to contract in advance that one of them will "not be lia-
ble for the consequences of conduct which would otherwise be
negligent." 24 Such an agreement should stem from free and
open bargaining between parties with relatively equal stature
or weight. Thus, employers will probably have the capacity and
118. Helton v. Hake, 564 S.W.2d 313, 320 (Mo. App.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 959
(1978).
119. See 29 U.S.C. § 654 (1976).
120. P. CHOWN, WORKPLACE HEALTH AND SAFETY: A GuIDE TO COLLEcrvE
BARGAINING 67-68 (1980).
121. See Springer v. Powder Power Tool Corp., 220 Or. 102, 108, 348 P.2d 1112,
1115 (1960); Cox, The Legal Nature of Collective Bargaining Agreements, 57
MICH. L REv. 1, 20 (1958).
122. See Feller, A General Theory of the Collective Bargaining Agreement,
61 CALF. L. REV. 663, 773-805 (1973).
123. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 68, at 442-43 (4th
ed. 1971).
124. Id. at 442.
[Vol. 65:635
UNION LIABILITY
power to negotiate a waiver of their potential legal remedies for
a union's negligence in conducting its health and safety func-
tions.l25
Some unions have bargained for indemnification clauses
that provide that the employer will compensate the union for
any damages, settlements, and legal fees arising out of the
union's negligent performance of its health and safety func-
tions. Although such clauses may be difficult to obtain at the
bargaining table, they do serve lawfully to insulate the union
from negligent performance of its health and safety powers.
Such agreements have been approved by the courts,126 al-
though there may exist some argument that these provisions
will encourage union negligence. Indemnification agreements
are common among manufacturers and seek to insure against
negligent acts. As the Seventh Circuit has commented,
"[t) here is nothing unconscionable or illicit involved in an indi-
vidual or private corporation contracting for protection against
his or its own negligence." 27 Likewise, an indemnification
agreement between a union and an employer is valid.
B. PREVENTING LIABILTY BY EXERCISING HEALTH AND SAFETY
AUTHoRITY
Lawsuits over a union's negligent performance of its health
and safety functions may be prevented not only by clever con-
tract language, but also by diligent and concerned enforcement
of those contract provisions. A union can show its good faith
efforts through 1) effective health and safety educational efforts
for its officers, representatives, and unit members; 2) timely
and effective exercise of inspection rights, committee member-
ship rights, and the like; 3) a willingness to consult the em-
ployer and outside agencies such as the Occupational Safety
and Health Administration and the National Institute for Occu-
125. The general presumption is that employers have greater economic
power than unions. 'Thus it is generally held that a contract exempting an em-
ployer from all liability for negligence toward his employees is void as against
public policy." Id. It is likely, however, than an agreement exempting a union
from all liability arising out of its health and safety functions would be valid
because 1) it is a waiver of liability for only one of the union's functions; 2)
health and safety concerns are generally the responsibility of the employer;
and 3) an agreement between two parties that gives the traditionally weaker
party an advantage must be presumed to be the product not of coercion but of
"free and open bargaining between the parties." Id.
126. Id. § 51, at 310 n.90.
127. Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Koontz-Wagner Elec. Co., 233 F.2d 380, 383 (7th
Cir. 1956).
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pational Safety and Health to report workplace conditions that
the union or its membership perceives as dangerous; 4) diligent
support of unit members' health and safety protests when
those objectives have merit under the contract; 5) careful eval-
uation of health and safety grievances; and 6) a willingness to
consult outside experts when health and safety problems are of
a technical or specialized nature.
C. LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS TO LnMrT LIABILITY
Finally, as the courts in Bryant and House suggested, there
are compelling policy reasons why unions should not be held
liable for their health and safety activities.128 The primary rea-
son is simple and straight-forward: if widespread liability is at-
tached to negligent performance of these functions, unions may
well respond by refusing to negotiate for further health and
safety powers.
These policy concerns have prompted some significant leg-
islative developments that attempt to address the problem of
union liability. One pertinent example is a provision already
incorporated in the Michigan workers' compensation legislation
that exempts unions, their members, and their safety commit-
tee members from liability for union activity, or lack of activity,
in health and safety matters. 2 9 Although the Michigan law is
significant, a state-by-state approach is necessarily of limited
benefit. Labor unions in industrial states such as Michigan
may benefit from the passage of such laws, but these laws are
unlikely to be enacted in less industrialized areas, where labor
is most vulnerable on this issue.
Proposed federal legislation has also specifically provided
for union nonliability. The Williams-Javits National Workers'
Compensation Standards bill provides that the proposed fed-
eral workers' compensation remedy "shall constitute the em-
ployee's exclusive remedy against the employer, the
employer's insurer or any collective-bargaining agent of the
employer's employees ... for any illness, injury, or death aris-
ing out of and in the course of his or her employment."130 This
provision extends to unions the protection of the typical exclu-
128. See Bryant v. International Union, UMW, 467 F.2d 1, 5-6 (6th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 410 U.S. 930 (1973); House v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., 417 F.
Supp. 939, 946 (D. Idaho 1976).
129. MIcH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 418.827(8) (West Supp. 1980).
130. S. 420, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 10(a) (1979).
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sive remedy provision found in most workers' compensation
laws. 31
VI. CONCLUSION
As organized labor bargains over the health and safety con-
cerns of its membership, it must bear in mind that it may be
exposing itself to potential legal liability. The unions' greatest
vulnerability does not arise under the duty of fair representa-
tion standards of federal labor law. Rather the possibility of a
lawsuit alleging a union's breach of state tort law looms as the
most significant legal threat. The preemption doctrine has
been used to limit state court actions, but in a few cases this
approach has been rejected. It is these cases that make unions
uneasy.
The threat of liability can be minimized without sacrificing
union influence or power over workplace health and safety
practices. Through careful drafting of contract provisions as
well as through adequate and informed enforcement, unions
can effectively limit the possibility of liability for health and
safety activities. Furthermore, various legislative proposals
may offer unions the legal protection that they seek.
A union's liability for its health and safety activities is a
relatively recent phenomenon. It is likely that such liability
will attract increased attention as unions assert more influence
over these issues and as public awareness of occupational
hazards increases. Although the threat of liability can cause
unions to be more diligent in health and safety matters, it can
also cause unions to forego further involvement in this crucial
area. For this reason unions argue they should be free of the
legal web of common law negligence when they become in-
volved in health and safety activities. The courts, the Congress,
and individual state legislatures must more thoroughly address
this policy issue.
131. See note 129 supra and accompanying text.
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